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CONCEPTION AND THE "ON SALE" BAR
DAVID W CARSTENS* AND CRAIG ALLEN NARD**
1. INTRODUCTION
A corporation in need of an innovative solution has sent a re-
quest for proposals to a number of suppliers. Your client has re-
sponded with a bid proposal that discloses her inventive solution.
Her solution is both novel and nonobvious. Your client is highly
skilled in the art but has not yet reduced her invention to practice
or tested it to determine its suitability The proposal, although of-
fered and held in confidence, was made over one year ago. Has
your client waived her right to patent protection by placing her
invention "on sale" with the bid proposal?
This scenario is both common and deserving of close attention.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in UMC Electronics
Co. v. United States1 and RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp.2 prob-
ably would have precluded patent protection in this situation.
Such a result, however, is uncertain at best in light of Envirotech
Corp. v. Westech Engineering, Inc.3 and Manville Sales Corp. v.
Paramount Systems, Inc.,4 two cases in which the Federal Circuit
appeared to back away from its earlier position. Does an "on sale"
event occur with the submission of a proposal? What factors does
the Federal Circuit consider in deciding this question? How should
* Associate, Hubbard, Thurman, Tucker & Harris, Dallas, Texas. B.S., Texas A&M Uni-
versity, 1986; J.D., Southern Methodist University, 1989.
** Visiting Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. B.A., Washing-
ton and Jefferson College, 1987; J.D., Capital University, 1990.
1. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that a patent was invalid because it had been on
sale more than one year prior to the application date for a patent and that reduction to
practice is not an absolute requirement of the "on sale" bar to patentability), cert. dented,
484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
2. 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding a patent invalid due to the statutory "on sale"
bar even though the offer to sell included experimental work).
3. 904 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that a bid proposal was not an "on sale" event
and that the patent was therefore not invalidated).
4. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that a court must consider the totality of cir-
cumstances to determine whether an invention was on sale or in public use for more than
one year prior to patent application so as to bar the patent).
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you advise your client? How should any court analyze these cases
in the future?
This Article will attempt to answer these questions in view of
current case law and will propose a framewurk by which "on sale"
events, including bid proposals, should be analyzed. This new test
for "on sale" deemphasizes reduction to practice and introduces a
dichotomy to the notion of conception: conception of embodiment
and conception of result.' We hope that our proposal will lead to
more consistent and equitable holdings by the courts and more
predictable results for inventors.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ON SALE" DOCTRINE
A. Statutory Basis
1. 'Section 102(b)
The United States allows an applicant a one-year grace period in
which to file her patent application after offering her invention for
sale, using the invention in public, or disclosing it in a printed
publication.' Section 102(b) of 35 U.S.C. provides: "A person shall
be entitled to a patent unless. . . the invention was. . . on sale in
this country, more than one year prior to the date of the applica-
tion for patent in the United States . . . ." In the scenario de-
scribed above, the question therefore remains whether the bid pro-
posal placed the invention on sale in the United States prior to the
"critical date," that is, more than one year prior to the filing date
of the patent application. The standard used to decide this ques-
tion has evolved significantly over the past century.'
2. Legislative Policies Behind Section 102(b)
The policies behind the "on sale" bar were stated in General
Electric Co. v. United States.9 The "on sale" bar supports a num-
ber of policies: 1) the "policy against removing inventions from the
public which the public has justifiably come to believe are freely
5. See infra notes 251-65 and accompanying text.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 35-176 and accompanying text.
9. 654 F.2d 55 (Ct. C1. 1981).
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available to all as a consequence of prolonged sales activity";10 2)
the "policy favoring prompt and widespread disclosure of new in-
ventions to the public";" 3) the policy against allowing the inven-
tor to exploit the exclusivity of his invention substantially beyond
the statutorily authorized seventeen-year period; 2 and 4) the pol-
icy allowing the inventor "a reasonable amount of time following
sales activity to determine whether a patent is a worthwhile invest-
ment."13 Because Congress has never defined what constitutes
placing an invention on sale, the courts often have utilized these
underlying policies to help frame the issues in cases dealing with
the "on sale" bar.
B. The "On Hand" Requirement
A review of case law relating to the degree to which an invention
must be completed in order to be placed on sale provides no con-
sistent standard. Early court decisions generally adopted the strict
requirement that a device must actually be produced and on hand
for delivery to a purchaser prior to the critical date in order to be
considered on sale.'4 The rationale behind these decisions was that
a device could not be sold or on sale until it was commercially
available for delivery to a customer.' 5
Some courts, however, began to create exceptions to the "on
hand" requirement when the requirement seemed to be inconsis-
tent with 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) or the public policy behind it.' 6 For
example, section 102(b) clearly prohibits either a public disclosure
or a printed publication of an invention prior to the critical date,
regardless of whether the invention was on hand.' 7 Thus, no logical




14. See Burke Elec. Co. v. Independent Pneumatic Tool Co., 232 F. 145 (2d Cir. 1916);
McCreery Eng'g Co. v. Massachusetts Fan Co., 195 F. 498 (1st Cir. 1912).
15. See McCreery, 195 F. at 501.
16. See Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp. 797, 815-18 (D. Del. 1961); Chicopee
Mfg. Corp. v. Columbus Fiber Mills Co., 165 F. Supp. 307, 320-21, 323-26 (M.D. Ga. 1958).
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
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basis could be seen for permitting commercialization prior to the
critical date simply because the invention was not on hand.",
In Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp.,19 the court analyzed the "on
hand" requirement in depth and rejected it altogether, reasoning
that solicitation, prior to the critical date, of an order for goods to
be produced at a future date was a "competitive use"20 under sec-
tion 102(b), but only if the inventor was sure of the character of
the "finished product."'" The Ninth Circuit similarly adopted the
rule that the device could be on sale as long as a "workable proto-
type" had been constructed prior to the critical date.22
Although the "on hand" requirement was gradually being re-
placed by the more lenient requirement that the invention must be
reduced to a complete physical embodiment, the term "reduction
to practice" had not yet been adopted.
C. The "Reduction to Practice" Requirement
As the "on hand" requirement lost merit, a new standard, the
"reduction to practice" test, gained influence. This test was first
put forth in Timely Products Corp. v. Arron.23 In Timely Prod-
ucts, the court reasoned that the "on hand" test was contrary to
the policy underlying section 102(b) of preventing an inventor
from keeping an invention secret while at the same time commer-
cially exploiting it. 24 In rejecting the "on hand" test, Timely Prod-
ucts established the following three-part test for an "on sale" bar:
1) "[t]he complete invention claimed must have been embodied in
or obvious in view of the thing offered for sale"; 25 2) "[t]he inven-
tion must have been tested sufficiently to verify that it is operable
and commercially marketable";26 and 3) "the sale must be primar-
ily for profit rather than for experimental purposes."2 The second
18. See Amphenol Corp. v. General Time Corp., 397 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1968); J. L. Clarke
Mfg. Co. v. American Can Co., 256 F. Supp. 719 (D.N.J. 1966).
19. 199 F. Supp. 797.
20. Id. at 816.
21. Id. at 817.
22. Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 426, 433 (9th Cir. 1973).
23. 523 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1975).
24. See id. at 301-02.
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part precludes application of the "on sale" bar prior to the inven-
tion's reduction to practice.
The requirement of an actual reduction to practice was thus sub-
stituted for the "on hand" requirement as the test for determining
whether an invention was sufficiently complete to place it on sale.28
"Reduction to practice" is a term of art borrowed from interfer-
ence practice,29 where it is employed to find the degree of comple-
tion of an invention necessary to prove priority of inventorship. 30
This standard requires sufficient testing of the invention to verify
that it would work for its intended purpose.3' Under Timely Prod-
ucts, this high standard of completion of an invention used in in-
terference proceedings under section 102(g) was adopted and ap-
plied to "on sale" determinations under section 102(b).
However, the "reduction to practice" test is subject to criticism
because it allows inventors to commercialize their inventions more
than one year prior to filing, simply by avoiding an actual reduc-
tion to practice. In essence, it permits inventors prematurely to ex-
ploit their inventions commercially, thus extending the seventeen-
year statutory period.32 The policies underlying section 102(b) pri-
marily serve to protect society, because the public benefits from
prompt disclosure of new and innovative inventions into the mar-
28. Id.
29. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (1988).
30. Reduction to practice can be considered to assume seven requirements:
(a) The reduction ... must have taken place in the United States.
(b) The reduction to practice must have been made by the inventor himself,
or by one authorized to do so either by the inventor or by one who acquired
the inventor's rights to the invention.
(c) The invention must have been embodied in a physical or tangible form.
(d) The physical embodiment of the invention, which is relied upon as the
reduction to practice, must show every essential feature of the invention as
defined in the count of the interference.
(e) The reduction to practice must demonstrate the practicability or utility
of the invention.
(f) The reduction to practice must have been appreciated by the inventor at
the time it was made.
(g) The fact that the reduction to practice took place must be sufficiently
corroborated in point of time.
1 CHARLES W. RviSE & A.D. CAESAR, INTERFERENCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 132 (1940).
31. Id.
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
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ketplace. 33 As discussed below, the consumer's cognizance of the
state of the invention is irrelevant with respect to application of
the "on sale" bar.3 4 With that in mind, reduction to practice serves
no purpose other than providing the inventor with a loophole to
extend the seventeen-year statutory period legally, thus preventing
expeditious disclosure of the invention for the benefit of society.
D. Federal Circuit Cases
Due to the prominence of the Federal Circuit in establishing the
boundaries of patent law, a review of its holdings is necessary to
understand the "on sale" bar. Numerous Federal-Circuit opinions
have been published discussing the "on sale" bar in depth.3 5 Each
of these cases involved a different panel of three judges, and each
panel analyzed the "on sale" bar differently.3 Some opinions
placed great emphasis on reduction to practice, while others mini-
mized its importance. In particular, the Federal Circuit in UMC
Electronics Co. v. United States37 appeared to eliminate the re-
quirement of reduction to practice entirely, leaving the "on sale"
doctrine in disarray.3
1. Cases Prior to UMC
In Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery,
Ltd.,3 9 the Federal Circuit reconsidered the Timely Products "re-
duction to practice" standard. Barmag made machines that
processed filament yarn and negotiated with Burlington Industries
for the sale of a machine specially designed for Burlington's
needs.40 Barmag completed construction of a machine in March
33. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text; infra notes 244-45 and accompanying
text.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 223-29.
35. See, e.g., Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Eng'g, Inc., 904 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990);
UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025
(1988); Western Marine Elecs., Inc. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
36. See infra appendix.
37. 816 F.2d 647.
38. Due to UMC's failure to provide adequate guidance, subsequent "on sale" cases have
created more ambiguity than clarity. Id. at 656; see infra notes 74-100 and accompanying
text.
39. 731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
40. Id. at 833.
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1975 and sent a detailed price quotation for the machine to Bur-
lington on April 8, 1975.41 Burlington personnel tested the machine
from June 2, 1975 to June 16, 1975.42 On June 13, 1975, Barmag
sent another detailed quotation to Burlington.43 Barmag then filed
a patent application on June 30, 1976.4" The district court, apply-
ing the Timely Products three-part test,45 held that the invention
was reduced to practice before June 30, 1975 and was clearly
placed on sale by the quotations.46
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court, but pointed out
that it did not adopt the Timely Products standard requiring re-
duction to practice for a section 102(b) bar.47 With respect to the
issue of reduction to practice, the court held that it was immaterial
that modifications were made in the machines actually delivered to
Burlington, because none of these changes concerned limitations in
the claims of the patent.48
In In re Caveney,49 the court of appeals held that a sale or offer
to sell must take place between separate entities in order to create
an "on sale" bar.50 The patent application involved a one-piece
cable tie that was designed to wrap around a bundle of wires to
41. Id. at 834.
42. Id. at 834-35.
43. Id. at 835.
44. Id. at 833.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 23-34.
46. Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 559 F. Supp. 491,
498 (W.D.N.C. 1983), aft'd, 731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
47. The court stated:
The Timely Products standard, while requiring less for "on sale" activity than
the "on hand" test, is, nevertheless, restrictive in that an offer to sell, without
the existence of a physical embodiment of what is offered, does not start the
running of the time period. It is not difficult to conceive of a situation where,
because commercial benefits outside the allowed time have been great, the
technical requisite of Timely Products for a physical embodiment, particularly
for a simple product, would defeat the statutory policy and we, therefore, do
not adopt the Timely Products test as the answer in all cases. However, since
the district court concluded that the test was met, and we agree, we need not
consider whether a less stringent standard might be appropriate in this case.
Barmag, 731 F.2d at 837.
48. Id. at 838.
49. 761 F.2d 671 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
50. See id. at 676 (citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Filtrol Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 482
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aft'd, 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 209 (9th Cir. 1973)).
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secure them together; 51 the subject application was filed on April 7,
1969.52 A competitor of the applicant, Bowthorpe-Hellerman Ltd.
(B-H), initiated a public-use proceeding and alleged that its own
patented cable tie, which was substantially similar to the appli-
cant's claimed invention, had been on sale over one year prior to
applicant's device. Specifically, on November 14, 1967, Insuloid
Manufacturing Corp., a subsidiary of B-H, sent samples of the
claimed invention for evaluation to Tyton Corp., a joint venture of
which B-H owned forty-nine percent. 54 Tyton placed an order set-
ting forth prices and quantities on February 9, 1968-but the ties
were not shipped until May 13, 1968-after the critical date.5
The board that heard the public-use proceeding found Insuloid
and Tyton to be separate entities whose relationship was
equivalent to the relationship between a manufacturer and either a
wholesaler or retailer.56 The Federal Circuit affirmed the board.57
The court defined a sale as "a contract between parties to give and
to pass rights of property for consideration which the buyer pays
or promises to pay the seller for the thing bought or sold."5 8 Addi-
tionally, it noted that one cannot make a contract with oneself;59
thus, a sale can be made only between two separate entities. In-
suloid (wholly controlled by B-H) and Tyton (controlled by its
fifty-one percent owner, Ideal Industries) were separate entities.6 0
Tyton further exhibited its independence from Insuloid by decid-
ing which Insuloid products it wanted to purchase.61
51. Id. at 673.
52. Id.
53. Id. Section 102(b) does not require that the claimed invention be placed on sale by
the applicant. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). The "on sale" bar to patentability also applies
when the invention is sold by someone other than the applicant. Caveney, 761 F.2d at 676.
54. Caveney, 761 F.2d at 673-74.
55. Id. at 674. The court, relying on Barmag, held that an offer to sell was sufficient to
create an "on sale" bar. See id. at 675.
56. Id. at 674. A dissenting member of the board asserted that Tyton resembled a mar-
keting group in a large corporation that receives samples from other groups in the corpora-
tion. Id. These samples would not be the subject of an "on sale" bar. Id.
57. Id. at 673.
58. Id. at 676 (citing 77 C.J.S. Sales § 1 (1952)).
59. Id.; see JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRAcTS § 1-10, at 17
(3d ed. 1987) ("Every contract involves at least two contracting parties.").
60. Caveney, 761 F.2d at 676.
61. Id.
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The court also reviewed the policy considerations underlying the
"on sale" bar, particularly the policy against removing from the
public domain inventions that the public justifiably has come to
believe are freely available.2 The court stated that the public is
not limited to potential users of the invention, but includes mem-
bers of the trade who would sell to potential customers.6 3 Thus,
Tyton's belief that the product was in the public domain was suffi-
cient to invoke the "on sale" bar. 4
In Western Marine Electronics, Inc. v. Furuno Electric Co.,6"
the Federal Circuit examined the importance of the reduction to
practice requirement in determining whether a device was on
sale. 6 The patented invention in question was a gravity-stabilized
sonar device for use on fishing boats.6 Western Marine argued
that because its device had not been mounted on a boat prior to
the critical date, the device had not undergone testing sufficient to
constitute a reduction to practice. 8 Unwilling to create a rigid re-
duction to practice requirement, 9 the court held that the inven-
tion was on sale prior to the critical date.70 The court stated that
the "totality of the circumstances ' 1 determined whether the de-
vice was on sale 2 and held that a letter to a potential customer
62. Id. (citing General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61 (Ct. Cl. 1981)).
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. 764 F.2d 840 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
66. See id. at 845.
67. Id. at 841.
68. Id. at 844.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 845.
71. Id.
72. The court stated:
A determination of whether an invention has been placed on sale within the
meaning of section 102(b) must be decided on the facts of each case.. . . [T]he
court will want to consider the totality of circumstances relating to the charac-
ter and extent of commercial activities, the type of invention and its stage of
development ... along with the character and extent of bona-fide ex-
perimentation.
Id.
The court explained further:
Rigid standards are especially unsuited to the on sale provision where the poli-
cies underlining the bar, in effect, define it.
As a result, this court has been careful to avoid erecting rigid standards for
section 102(b). . . . While approving of the Timely Products criticism of the
1993]
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before the critical date stating a selling price and estimating a de-
livery date was sufficient evidence of "on sale" activities.73
2. UMC: The "Substantial Embodiment" Requirement
In UMC Electronics Co. v. United States,74 the Federal Circuit,
although recognizing the shortcomings of the reduction to practice
analysis,75 fashioned an equally imperfect and vague "on sale"
analysis. The court considered to be an "on sale" event a bid for a
government contract to supply at a specified price a device falling
within the claims of the patent, even though the patentee had not
built or tested the device before the critical date.76 The device, an
aviation counting accelerometer (ACA), senses and records the
number of times an aircraft has been subjected to predetermined
levels of acceleration.77 Dissatisfied with existing ACAs, the United
States Navy contacted UMC in 1966 and awarded UMC a contract
to supply ACAs; the Navy, however, became dissatisfied with
UMC's models as well.78 To avoid losing the Navy contract, UMC
designed and tested an engineering prototype of a new ACA in
April and May of 1967.79 Two months later, the Navy requested
proposals from contractors to deliver ACAs built to a new specifi-
cation, and UMC submitted its bid on July 27, 1967.80 The bid
included a price quote and brief description of the proposed de-
vice."' On August 2, 1967, UMC submitted a more detailed descrip-
"on hand" doctrine because the doctrine often produces results contrary to the
basic policy underlying the on sale bar, this court nevertheless declined to
adopt the Timely Products test for all cases ....
Id. at 844 (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 846.
74. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
75. See id. at 652-57.
76. Id. at 657.
77. Id. at 649.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 650.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court stated that UMC responded "with an offer to supply $1,668,743 worth
of its improved ACA... . UMC represented as part of its proposal that the sensor portion
'has been constructed and tested in conjunction with voltage sensing and time controlled
circuitry.' " Id.
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tion including test results."2 On August 1, 1968, UMC filed an ap-
plication for the patent that became the subject of the lawsuit. s3
In June, 1980, UMC sued the Navy for compensation under 28
U.S.C. § 1498(a), claiming that the Navy had used UMC's ACA
design without awarding UMC a contract to supply the ACAs.8 4
The Navy countered by claiming that the patent was invalid be-
cause UMC had tried to sell its device more than a year prior to
the date it filed for a patent.85 The Claims Court upheld the valid-
ity of the patent claims but found no governmental infringement.8 6
Applying the three-part test set out in In re Corcoran,"7 the Claims
Court noted that UMC had admitted that its offer to the Navy was
for profit, and not for experimentation. Next, the court found
that the invention claimed in the patent had been reduced to prac-
tice prior to the critical date;89 however, the court held that "the
first requirement that the complete invention must be embodied
in the thing offered for sale [had] not been met because the engi-
neering prototype did not include all elements of the claims."90
In essence, the Claims Court interpreted Barmag Barmer
Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd.9 1 as creating an
exception to the physical embodiment requirement if commercial
benefits before the critical date were great.2 Because UMC never
made its ACA, the court concluded that the company reaped no
commercial benefits, and that the invention of the patent-in-suit




85. Id. at 651.
86. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 604, 627 (1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
87. 640 F.2d 1331, 1333-34 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (following the three-part test set forth in
Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 302 (2d Cir. 1975)); see supra notes 23-27 and
accompanying text.
88. UMC, 8 Cl. Ct. at 620.
89. Id. The court ruled that testing of the prototype prior to submitting the proposal
constituted a reduction to practice. Id.
90. UMC, 816 F.2d at 651 (discussing the decision of the Claims Court).
91. 731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
92. UMC, 816 F.2d at 651.
93. UMC, 8 Cl. Ct. at 620-21.
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The Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court and concluded
that a "substantial embodiment" of the claimed invention existed
prior to the critical date, even though the invention had not been
reduced to practice.9 4 Despite the lack of a reduction to practice,
the degree of commercialization of the invention prior to the criti-
cal date sufficiently proved that the invention was on sale. 5 The
court also stated that an offer of a "mere concept" for sale before
the critical date would not invalidate a patent.98 A very important
point noted by the court was that mere participation by a pur-
chaser in the development and experimental testing of an inven-
tion does not by itself indicate that the invention was on sale. 7
Judge Nies, writing for the court, used the term "substantial em-
bodiment" '98 to refer to the level of completion of the invention
necessary to place it on sale. She declined, however, to define this
standard, stating, "We do not attempt here to formulate a stan-
dard for determining when something less than a complete embod-
iment of the invention will suffice under the on-sale bar."99 Unfor-
tunately for patent attorneys and their clients, the Federal Circuit
has yet to "formulate a standard."'00
3. Federal Circuit Cases: Post-UMC
Although the Federal Circuit has had numerous opportunities to
clarify the meaning of "substantial embodiment," it has failed to
do so. For example, in Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Industries, Inc.,101
94. UMC, 816 F.2d. at 657.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 656. ("[WIe do not intend to sanction attacks on patents on the ground that
the inventor or another offered for sale, before the critical date, the mere concept of the
invention. Nor should inventors be forced to rush into the Patent and Trademark Office
prematurely.").
97. Id. at 657. Furthermore, with respect to reduction to practice, the court noted:
"[R]eduction to practice" [is] an important analytical tool in an on-sale analy-
sis. A holding that there has or has not been a reduction to practice of the
claimed invention before the critical date may well determine whether the
claimed invention was in fact the subject of the sale or offer to sell or whether
a sale was primarily for an experimental purpose.
Id. at 656.
98. Id. at 657.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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the Federal Circuit reversed a holding that the claimed invention
was not on sale. 10 2 The invention was a self-closing cam-lift hinge
for use on refrigerator doors. 10 3 Five months prior to the critical
date, the inventor showed a working model to a manufacturer of
refrigerator doors.104 The inventor agreed to sell the hinge exclu-
sively to the manufacturer and delivered a "Quotation" four
months before the critical date.10 5 The "Quotation" included a no-
tation entitled "Terms of Sale."'1 6 The trial court in Buildex re-
fused to hold that the invention was on sale because the inventor
and his assignee developed it jointly.10 7 The Federal Circuit re-
jected this basis for the trial court's holding, noting that the Fed-
eral Circuit never had recognized a joint development exception to
the "on sale" bar. 08 Instead, the Federal Circuit found the "Quo-
tation" and its "Terms of Sale" to be the "most telling evi-
dence"' 09 of an offer for sale." 0
In RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp.,"' RCA submitted a propo-
sal to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) describing a sys-
tem called real time generation of video (RTGV).112 The proposal
included a detailed description, financial data, and cost analysis."l 3
The district court held that the proposal placed the invention on
sale." 4 RCA appealed several aspects of the lower court's decision
102. Id. at 1464. The court held that before the critical date, the manufacturer had made
an offer for sale that was sufficient to demonstrate an "on sale" status. Id. (relying on UMC,
816 F.2d at 656).




107. Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 665 F. Supp. 1021, 1033 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd,
849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
108. Buildex, 849 F.2d at 1465.
109. Id. at 1463.
110. Id. at 1463-64.
111. 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
112. Id. at 1059.
113. Id. at 1062.
114. RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 701 F. Supp. 456, 464 (D. Del. 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d
1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989). The court stated:
RCA's submission of the proposal to the FAA was a definite offer to sell the
RTGV system. The FAA was not seeking to fund research programs; instead, it
was looking for a "prototype system" to be followed by "production quanti-
1993]
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to the Federal Circuit, but the Federal Circuit disposed of each
argument and affirmed.11" 5
First, RCA claimed that the proposal did not place the invention
on sale because it did not disclose the invention with respect to all
the claim elements."' The Federal Circuit dismissed this position
as legally incorrect, suggesting other sources of evidence, including
advertisements, that may prove the existence of an offer." 7 Be-
cause the bid documents themselves contained enough information
to identify the invention, the court held that sufficient evidence
existed to support a finding of an offer for sale." 8
Second, RCA contended that its submission could not create an
"on sale" bar because its bid proposal was for research and devel-
opment of the complex RTGV system, which therefore was still in
the experimental stage." 9 The appellate court responded by stat-
ing that a plaintiff cannot offer the experimental-use defense to
rebut a prima facie case that the invention was on sale. 20 Because
the court defined experimental use as the perfection or completion
ties." . . . RCA viewed the FAA as a "prospective customer" who could pro-
vide "a major piece of business" resulting in revenue to RCA.
Id.
115. RCA, 887 F.2d at 1059-65.
116. Id. at 1060.
117. Id. The Federal Circuit held that RCA's position was
clearly not legally correct.. . . [M]erely offering to sell a product by way of an
advertisement or invoice may be evidence of a definite offer for sale or a sale of
a claimed invention even though no details are disclosed. That the offered
product is in fact the claimed invention may be established by any relevant




119. Id. at 1061.
120. Id. The court stated:
As held in UMC, an invention cannot be offered for sale within the meaning
of section 102(b) if the offeror has only a mere concept of the invention. As
also indicated in UMC, while an invention need not be reduced to practice to
be on sale, such proof may "lighten the burden of the party asserting the bar."
Under our precedent, actual reduction to practice of the subject invention
means .. . that an actual embodiment which included all elements of the
claim had been built.
Id. (citations omitted). Here, the appellate court upheld the district court's findings that
RCA had offered to sell the Cole invention, the core of the RTGV system, and that RCA
had reduced the Cole invention to practice. Id. at 1060-61.
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of an invention to the point at which it will work for its intended
purpose, the experimental-use defense expires with an invention's
reduction to practice.121
In a variation of its experimental-use justification, RCA next
claimed that because the proposal was for experimental develop-
ment of the RTGV system, RCA had not made a "definite of-
fer.1 22 When no sale occurs, a definite offer to sell is an essential
requirement of the "on sale" bar.123 In its brief, however, RCA ac-
knowledged that the FAA could have "accepted" RCA's proposal;
this possibility for acceptance is characteristic of a definite formal
offer. 12
4
In a final attempt to convince the court, RCA argued that its
contract was for "services" to design and develop a prototype and
that it had not actually offered any."thing" for sale. 25 RCA also
asked the court not to use labels to describe its activities but to
consider whether in the totality of the circumstances its behavior
was contrary to the policies of the "on sale" bar. 26 The court
called these arguments self-contradictory.127 In dictum, however,
the court acknowledged that once commercialization is shown,
merely labeling a contract as an offer for services does not prevent
the application of the "on sale" bar. 28
In Envirotech Corp. v. Westech Engineering, Inc.,'29 the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit considered whether the "on
121. Compare Pharmacia, Inc. v. Frigitronics, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 710 (D. Mass. 1989), in
which the court stated:
[P]roducing a desired outcome once [is not] a "reduction to practice." Even
after producing some lots of hyaluronic acid that met his criteria, [the inven-
tor] had to continue his experiments to determine whether he could, with at
least a degree of consistency sufficient to constitute a "reduction to practice,"
reproduce this non-inflammatory hyaluronic acid.
Id. at 714.
122. RCA, 887 F.2d at 1062.
123. Id. (citing UMC Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647, 656 (Fed. Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988)). Contrary to RCA's reading, the fact that an offer con-




126. Id. at 1062-63.
127. Id. at 1063.
128. Id.
129. 904 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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sale" bar invalidated the patent for a ballasted digester cover used
in waste-water treatment plants.3 0 The device was disclosed by
Envirotech in response to a December 1979 invitation to bid on a
waste-water treatment plant project. 181
Envirotech submitted proposals for a digester cover on February
21, 1980 to each general contractor bidding on the mechanical por-
tion of the project. 32 The bids included a price and offered to pro-
vide a digester cover constructed in accordance with the plans and
design specifications of the project's consulting engineer, which
called for the use of traditional solid concrete ballast blocks. 33 The
treatment plant scheduled a re-bid for May 8, 1980; in the interim,
Envirotech employees conceived of the hydroballaster 3 4 Between
May 5 and May 8, 1980, Envirotech submitted its second proposal
to all general contractors. 35 This bid offered a "digester gas holder
cover" for $134,000-$71,000 less than the first proposal. 36 Only
on May 30, 1980 did Envirotech actually disclose the details of its
new design to the consulting engineer in charge of setting design
specifications for general contractors. 31 Envirotech finally filed a
patent application on May 29, 1981.138
To reverse the district court's decision that the "on sale" bar
invalidated the patent,13 9 the Federal Circuit relied upon the poli-
cies behind section 102(b).140 First, the various general contractors
could not have come to believe that the hydroballaster was freely
available based upon Envirotech's second bid proposal.14 ' Second,
the court stated that the inventor's attempted exploitation must
be "objectively manifested" as a definite offer to sell the inven-
tion. 4 2 Although the district court considered the May 8 proposal
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1572-73.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1573.
134. Id. The hydroballaster is a floating-cover digester, rather than a traditional, fixed-
cover digester. Id. at 1572.




139. Id. at 1574-77.
140. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see supra text accompanying notes 9-13.
141. Envirotech, 904 F.2d at 1574.
142. Id. at 1575.
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to be sufficient to invoke the "on sale" bar, the Federal Circuit
disagreed.143 Judge Mayer, writing for the court, stated that the
district court "unduly focused" on Envirotech's clear motive to
profit from the invention.1 4 4 In fact, Envirotech's own internal
memorandum disclosed its intention to offer traditional technology
with its bid proposal and then later to disclose the new technology
as a substitute only if it received the contract. 45 Thus, the key
factor that saved Envirotech from the "on sale" bar was the fact
that the bid documents clearly specified the traditional technology
rather than the patented invention. 46
Similarly, a district court's holding that no "on sale" bar existed
was upheld by the Federal Circuit in Manville Sales Corp. v. Para-
mount Systems, Inc. 47 The patent involved a luminaire' 45 with
"iris" guide arms developed by Manville. 4 ' Manville's research
manager had constructed a working model of the device in October
1971 and proposed the design to the State of Wyoming for use at a
roadside rest area. 50 The proposal included a confidentiality no-
tice.' 5 ' A Wyoming official conditionally approved payment for the
design, subject to its satisfactory performance.152 The iris arm de-
vice was installed at the rest area in November 1971, several




146. The court stated:
The facts here thus differ markedly from those in RCA, which Westech relies
on, and do not support an on sale bar. Here, the bid documents clearly specify
the Hill design rather than the patented invention; [in RCA] they contained a
technical description sufficient to identify the patented invention. Here, the
district court found that Envirotech planned in its May 8 proposal to keep the
patented design of its ballast blocks confidential; there, testimonial evidence
established that the offeror intended to offer the invention prior to the critical
date.
Id. at 1576 (citations omitted).
147. 917 F.2d 544, 551 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
148. The luminaire assembly at issue was basically a multiple lamp fixture designed to be




152. Id. at 548.
153. Id.
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Wyoming officials inspected the device and authorized payment. 154
The rest area was opened to the public in June 1972.155
On February 5, 1973, Manville filed a patent application that
later issued as the patent.156 Paramount obtained a copy of a draw-
ing of Manville's iris arm device in 1984 and designed a similar
self-centering luminaire. 157 Manville filed suit against Paramount
in 1986.158 The trial court concluded that the patent was not inva-
lid under section 102(b) despite the fact that more than one year
had elapsed between the device's installation in Wyoming and
Manville's application for a patent.151 Instead, the court deemed
the Wyoming activity an experimental use. 160
The Federal Circuit affirmed 6 ' and analyzed the facts in view of
the underlying policies of the "on sale" bar. 162 First, the court rea-
soned that Manville did nothing to lead the public to believe that
Manville's iris arm invention was in the public domain.163 The de-
signs were submitted subject to a confidentiality agreement, and
the devices were placed at the top of a 150-foot pole in a rest area
not yet open to the public.' Second, Manville did not attempt to
extend the patent term by commercially exploiting its invention
for more than one year before filing its application. 6 5 Manville did
not initiate a sales campaign to market the iris arm design until
March 1972.166 Last, Manville's actions, in the court's estimation,
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 549.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291, 1299 (E.D.
Pa. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
160. Id.
161. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d 544. The circuit court affirmed all appealed issues but re-
versed the lower court on the issue of personal liability of the individual defendants. Id. at
547.
162. Id. at 549-51.
163. Id. at 550.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The court stated:
Because Manville did not attempt to use the invention when it first bid on the
Wyoming contract, and did not offer to sell the iris arm to anyone else until
after it was tested in the cold, rain, snow, and wind-an environment in which
it was designed to operate-we must agree with the district court that experi-
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were consistent with promoting prompt and widespread disclosure
of the invention. 6 7 The court reasoned that the design could not
have been disclosed until testing had laid to rest the inventor's
uncertainty over the luminaire's ability to withstand harsh
weather."6 8
In Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc.,169 the district court invali-
dated Sonoscan's patent for the display image circuitry for a scan-
ning acoustic microscope, finding that it had been placed on sale
before the critical date. 170 The basis of the court's conclusion was
the fact that on November 18, 1986 and September 10, 1987, So-
noscan had submitted price quotations to IBM for its Model 3100
scanning acoustic microscope containing the circuitry.17 1 On Sep-
tember 15, 1988, Sonoscan filed a patent application for the device,
which matured into the patent asserted against Sonotek.17
2
The Federal Circuit agreed that Sonoscan's patent was inva-
lid.7 Judge Lourie, writing for the court, dismissed Sonoscan's as-
sertion that the invention was not developed sufficiently by the
critical date of September 15, 1987 to be on sale. 7 4 The court con-
centrated on the content of the September 10, 1987 quotation and
noted that it did not refer to the machine's capability to display
amplitude and polarity data as a "unified image" as recited in the
issued apparatus claim. 7 5 Sonoscan admitted, however, that if
IBM had placed an order pursuant to the September 10 quotation,
it would have received a machine that had the unified image
capability. 7 6
mentation, and not profit, was the primary motive behind Manville's Wyoming
use.
Id. This statement appears to be an admission by the court that Manville did in fact sell the
luminaire to the State of Wyoming.
167. Id. at 551.
168. Id. at 550.
169. 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1247 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff'd, 936 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
170. Id. at 1250.
171. Id. at 1249. Similarly, Sonoscan quoted a price to Amdahl Corp. for the same model
on September 18, 1987. Id.
172. Id.
173. Sonoscan, 936 F.2d 1261.
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III. ELEMENTS OF AN "ON SALE" BID
A review of Federal Circuit case law shows no clear standard for
defining when an "on sale" event occurs. Indeed, in UMC Elec-
tronics Co. v. United States,'17 Judge Nies warned against the es-
tablishment of rigid standards. 7 8 Several of the cases discussed
above looked at the "totality of the circumstances,'79 whereas
others placed great weight on the existence of individual cir-
cumstances. 80
A framework that will instill some order and create better un-
derstanding of the "on sale" event should include the following
considerations: 1) whether the invention actually has been reduced
to practice at the time of the offer; 2) whether the bid describes
the invention to such an extent that it constitutes a
constructive reduction to practice; 3) whether the level of com-
mercialization is so great that, for public policy reasons, the inven-
tion should be considered on sale regardless of whether it has been
reduced to practice; and 4) whether the inventor is satisfied with
his invention to the extent that experimental use can no longer
mitigate commercialization of the device.
Although this list is not exhaustive, it appears that when any
one of these conditions exists at the time an offer is made, a court
probably will conclude that the invention has been placed on sale.
Existence of two or more of the conditions virtually assures that a
court will deem the invention to be on sale.
A. Actual Reduction to Practice
Reduction to practice, although not a requirement, is clearly an
important factor in the "on sale" bar analysis. Courts are most
likely to deem an offer to be an "on sale" event when the inventor
177. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
178. Id. at 653 (" 'Rigid standards are especially unsuited to the on sale provision where
the policies underlying the bar, in effect, define it.' ") (quoting Western Marine Elecs., Inc.
v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)).
179. E.g., Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 549 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("In order to determine whether an invention was on sale. .. we must consider how the
totality of the circumstances comports with the policies underlying the on sale ... bar[].").
180. E.g., Sonoscan, 936 F.2d at 1262-63 (analyzing the timing and content of three price
quotations in determining that Sonoscan's invention had been placed on sale before the
critical date).
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offers for sale an invention that is actually reduced to practice at
the time of the offer.
1. Simple Devices
The simpler a device, the greater the likelihood that it will be
reduced to practice prior to any offer for sale. Paradoxically, how-
ever, the simpler a device, the less likely that a court will focus on
reduction to practice. For example, in In re Caveney,'8 ' the inven-
tion involved a simple cable tie, and reduction to practice was
never in dispute. Instead, the court closely scrutinized the details
of the transaction. 82 In Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Industries, Inc., 8
the self-closing cam-lift hinge, a relatively simple invention, had
been reduced to practice more than five months prior to the criti-
cal date.1 84 Again, the court concentrated on the elements of the
sale, such as the price quote, rather than discussing the state of the
invention's reduction to practice or the correlation between the
claimed invention and the device actually sold.8 5 Likewise, in En-
virotech Corp. v. Westech Engineering, Inc.,8 which involved
tub-shaped concrete blocks utilized to ballast the lower rim of a
floating digester cover, the court did not discuss the development
of the blocks but instead concentrated on Envirotech's disclosure
of the blocks in its bid proposal.8
7
2. Complex Devices
The more complex the device, the more likely that a court will
concentrate on reduction to practice. For example, in Barmag
Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd.,' s the
filament yarn machine was substantially reduced to practice prior
to submission of either of the quotations.8 9 The court deemed ir-
relevant some later, minor modifications because they did not con-
181. 761 F.2d 671 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
182. See id. at 675-77.
183. 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
184. Id. at 1462.
185. Id. at 1463-66.
186. 904 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
187. See id. at 1575-77.
188. 731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
189. See id. at 834.
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cern limitations in the claims. 190 Instead, the court analyzed the
level of the machine's development in view of the three-part
Timely Products test.'9 '
In contrast, the analysis set forth in UMC Electronics Co. v.
United States19 2 concentrated on the degree to which the inven-
tion had been completed.9'9 Although the ACAs ultimately sup-
plied to the United States Navy were covered by the language of
the patent claims, the patentee had not built or tested the device
before the critical date.194 Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit ruled
that a "substantial embodiment"' 95 of the device existed prior to
the critical date.9 6 The inventor conceived of an ACA with an ana-
log transducer; 97 his engineering prototype of the ACA contained
a commercial analog transducer along with a filter, timing circuit,
and voltage sensor that measured one load level. 19 8 The court's de-
termination of substantial embodiment rested on two factors.
First, "the prior art devices embodied each element of the claimed
invention, save one."'' 99 Second, that missing element "was availa-
ble and had been sufficiently tested to demonstrate to the sat-
isfaction of the inventor that the invention. . . would work for its
intended purpose. "200 After setting forth these factual determina-
tions, the court ruled that one must resolve within the meaning of
section 102(b) whether the circumstances as a whole place the in-
vention on sale prior to the critical date.20
190. Id. at 838.
191. Id. (citing Timely Prods. Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 302 (2d Cir. 1975)); see supra
text accompanying notes 23-31.
192. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
193. Id. at 652 ("Under our precedent there cannot be a reduction to practice of the in-
vention here without a physical embodiment which includes all limitations of the claim.").
194. Id.
195. Id. at 657.
196. Id. at 652.
197. Id. at 650.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 657.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 656. The court went on to state:
All of the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to sell, including the
stage of development of the invention and the nature of the invention, must be
considered and weighed against the policies underlying section 102(b). . ..
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In Sonoscan, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc.,0 2 the court reviewed in great
detail the inventive process for the scanning acoustic microscope's
complex unified display circuit. 20 3 The court focused on such dates
as the date of conception, the date of the first lab notebook entries,
the date of the first schematic drawing, and the date of the the
first operational prototype.20 4 The court apparently placed great
weight on the fact that the schematic diagram and working proto-
type, both in existence before the critical date, contained circuitry
capable of displaying a unified image as claimed. 05
B. Constructive Reduction to Practice
A constructive reduction to practice occurs when a written dis-
closure is adequate to enable a person having ordinary skill in the
art to construct the device.206 Under certain circumstances, the
Federal Circuit has implied that a mere constructive reduction to
practice coupled with an offer to sell is adequate to constitute an
"on sale" event.207 Even if no physical embodiment of the com-
pleted invention exists, a bid proposal may be so detailed that it
discloses many if not all of the claim elements. Such was the case
in RCA Corp. v. Data General Corp.,208 wherein the bid propos-
al was so detailed as to constitute a constructive reduction to
practice.20 9
The proposal in RCA detailed an RTGV system which RCA
claimed was for a system more complex than that disclosed and
. . . If the inventor had merely a conception or was working towards devel-
opment of that conception, it can be said there is not yet any "invention"
which could be placed on sale. A sale made because the purchaser was partici-
pating in experimental testing creates no on-sale bar.
Id. at 656-57.
202. 936 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
203. The court claimed to follow the "totality of the circumstances" standard, but it con-
centrated on reduction to practice and the offer to sell. Id. at 1263-64.
204. Id. at 1248-49.
205. Id. at 1250.
206. See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
207. See, e.g., King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(holding an offer to sell is sufficient to bar patentability because the statute requires "plac-
ing on sale," not a sale), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 676
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that a single offer to sell is sufficient to bar patentability).
208. 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
209. Id. at 1060-61.
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claimed in its patent.210 Specifically, RCA stated that the patent
claims detailed an entirely digital system whereas the system pro-
posed contained some analog components.21 ' RCA therefore
claimed that the proposal did not place the invention on sale be-
cause the proposal did not disclose the invention with respect to
all the claim elements. 1 2 The Federal Circuit dismissed this posi-
tion as legally incorrect, stating that a mere advertisement may ev-
idence an offer for sale.2 13 Thus, a constructive reduction to prac-
tice coupled with an offer to sell may trigger the "on sale" clock
even when discrepancies exist between the proposal and the
claimed invention.
C. Level of Commercialization
As discussed above, a key policy concern behind the "on sale"
doctrine is its ability to prevent the inventor from commercially
exploiting the exclusivity of his invention substantially beyond the
statutorily authorized seventeen-year period.21 4
1. The Offer
a. Was an Offer Made?
Many of the Federal Circuit cases discussed above involved bid
proposals submitted in response to a request for bids.21 5 Thus, as
in the initial scenario, a proposal is made purposely as an offer that
the offeror wants the offeree to accept. If no sale is made, a definite
offer to sell is an essential requirement in finding an "on sale"
bar.116 If multiple offers are provided by the applicant, courts ap-
pear more likely to find that an applicant was attempting to com-
mercialize her invention. For example, in Barmag Barmer Mas-
210. Id. at 1061.
211. Id. at 1060. The court stated that "the [trial court] quite correctly placed no legal
significance on the analog circuitry because no analog circuitry is claimed. The fact that the
RTGV system may feature additional analog circuitry does not negate the determination
that the claimed invention was offered." Id. at 1060-61.
212. Id. at 1060.
213. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 23-34.
215. See supra part II.D.
216. See, e.g., RCA, 887 F.2d at 1062.
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chinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd.,2 1  two offers were
submitted. The fact that both fell before the critical date helped
establish Barmag's intent to commercialize its yarn processing ma-
chine.218 In UMC Electronics Co. v. United States,10 two separate
quotes were provided to the ultimate purchaser prior to the critical
date, leading the court to conclude that sufficient commercializa-
tion had occurred to create an "on sale" bar.220 Likewise, in Sonos-
can, Inc. v. Sonotek, Inc.,2 1 multiple offers were made to both
IBM and Amdahl.22
b. Could the Offer Be Accepted?
Whether an offer can be accepted should have little bearing on
whether an "on sale" event occurs. Only the intent of the applicant
to exploit his invention matters, not the degree to which the pur-
chaser was cognizant of the invention.2 As the court stated in
UMC: "An offer to sell a later-claimed invention may be sufficient
to invoke the bar whether the offer is accepted or rejected. '224
However, in In re Caveney,2  the court engaged in a contractual
analysis with respect to the product at issue. It defined a sale as "a
contract between parties to give and to pass rights of property for
consideration which the buyer pays or promises to pay the seller
for the thing bought or sold. '226 Additionally, the court held that a
bid could be accepted only by a separate entity, as one may not
make a contract with oneself.217 Hence, in RCA Corp. v. Data Gen-
eral Corp.,228 the admission by RCA that its proposal could be ac-
217. 731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
218. See Barmag, 731 F.2d at 837-39.
219. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988); see supra notes 74-
100 and accompanying text.
220. UMC, 816 F.2d at 657.
221. 936 F.2d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
222. Sonoscan, 936 F.2d at 1262.
223. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
224. UMC, 816 F.2d at 653 (citing King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 860).
225. 761 F.2d 671 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
226. Id. at 676.
227. Id.; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
228. 887 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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cepted by the FAA undercut its other arguments that the proposal
was not a contract or sale.22" 9
2. Did the Offer List a Price?
Although nebulous discussions about a possible sale may not
trigger the "on sale" bar,230 the more detailed a proposal becomes,
the more likely a court will find adequate commercial activity to
invoke the "on sale" bar. Quoting a definite price for a definite
quantity of goods usually will constitute ample proof of this level
of commercial activity.
For example, in Barmag, the first quotation listed a price of
$346,900 per machine for twenty-five machines.231 In UMC, the
proposal contained a price of approximately $1.7 million to supply
a quantity of ACAs.2 s2 The "Terms of Sale" in Buildex listed a
quantity of 50,000 hinges at a price of $2.84 each.2 3 Thus, while
not ,a requirement for forming a valid contract, listing a price in
the proposal simply adds credence to the conclusion that an inven-
tion is on sale.
D. Inventor's Satisfaction Level with the Invention
Of the four factors of the "on sale" framework, the most obvious
contradictions in case law involve the importance of whether the
inventor is satisfied that he has reduced his invention to practice.
This inquiry centers on whether he has tested the device in its ex-
pected environment of use and whether any postdelivery modifica-
tions-have been necessary.
1. Testing in the Expected Environment
In Western Marine Electronics, Inc. v. Furuno Electric Co.,
234
the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's decision invalidat-
229. Id. at 1062.
230. Id.
231. Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 834
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
232. UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1025 (1988).
233. Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
234. 764 F.2d 840 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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ing appellant's patent under section 102(b).23 The patent related
to a sonar device to be used on fishing boats for detecting the loca-
tion of various objects. One of the arguments put forth by the ap-
pellant was that there could be no "on sale" bar because the inven-
tion was not tested "in the environment for which it was in-
tended." 26
However, the Federal Circuit found "no clear error in the dis-
trict court's finding"2 7 that the invention was on sale prior to the
critical date2 38 and found that appellant's activities with its cus-
tomers were primarily for commercial, not experimental, pur-
poses.2 39 Therefore, the fact that the invention was not tested in
the environment for which it was intended was of little moment.
Yet in Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc.,24 ° the
Federal Circuit placed great emphasis on the need for an inventor
to test her invention in the environment for which she intended
it. 241 More than one year prior to filing its patent application,
Manville installed its device in an environment for which it was
intended.2 42 The district court found that "no one could have
known . . . whether the [patented invention] would work as in-
tended" 243 prior to its installation.
The Federal Circuit believed that Manville's actions were "en-
tirely consistent with the policy 'favoring prompt and widespread
disclosure of inventions,' ,,244 noting that the patented device "was
specifically designed to withstand year around weather. Prior to its
testing in the winter environment, there really was no basis for
235. The appellate court held that the district court did not err in determining that the
product was complete and did not require additional testing before the critical date. Id. at
845.
236. Id. at 844.
237. Id. at 845.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 847.
240. 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
241. Id. at 550-51.
242. Manville installed the device in November 1971 and filed the patent application on
March 5, 1973. Id. at 548-49.
243. Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291, 1293 (E.D.
Pa. 1989), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
244. Manville Sales, 917 F.2d at 550 (quoting King Investment Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767
F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986)).
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confidence by the inventor that the invention would perform as
intended, and hence no proven invention to disclose. '245
Western Marine and Manville Sales may be reconcilable in so
far as the appellant in Western Marine might have fabricated a
postlitigation argument. That is, prior to the critical date in West-
ern Marine, appellant ascertained that the sonar device was com-
plete and worked for its intended purpose. In contrast, prior to the
critical date in Manville Sales, the design durability of the new iris
arm in weather conditions was unknown and, therefore, completion
required additional atmospheric testing.
2. Postdelivery Modifications
In Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery,
Ltd.,246 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding of
invalidity under section 102(b) on the ground that the claimed in-
vention was placed on sale prior to the critical date.247 On appeal,
the appellant asserted, inter alia, that various modifications were
made to the invention subsequent to delivery to the purchaser.24 s
According to the appellant, the invention was not "complete 2 49
and, therefore, was not on sale.
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument, asserting that "[ilt
is . . . immaterial that modifications were made in the machines
actually delivered to Burlington [the purchaser]. . . . No change
was made that concerns limitations in the claims. 2 °5 0 Accordingly,
modifications performed after delivery to the purchaser have little,
if any, mitigating effect with respect to an "on sale" event, unless
the modifications concern limitations in the claims. To what extent
the changes must relate to the claims in order to render such
changes relevant is unclear.
245. Id.
246. 731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 837-38.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 838.
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IV. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO ANALYZE
"ON SALE" EVENTS
A. Conception of Embodiment vs. Conception of Result
Initially, one may think that the word "conception" denotes an
abstract or seminal idea lacking tangibility or practical application.
In the context of patent law, however, such could not be further
from the truth. For conception to be better understood in this con-
text, it must be defined further or broken into subcategories: 1)
conception of embodiment and 2) conception of result.251 Concep-
tion of embodiment transcends the perception of desiring a partic-
ular result and focuses on an operative and complete means of
achieving a particular result, such that nothing remains but physi-
cal realization. On the other hand, conception of result concerns
itself with only the end product, not the means by which it is
achieved.
The court in Mergenthaler v. Scudder,2 although not labeling
it as such, enunciated a classic definition of conception of embodi-
ment: "[Conception] is therefore the formation, in the mind of the
inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and
operative invention, as it is thereafter to be applied in practice
... 2 3 With this definition in mind, one can say that conception
of embodiment is a cerebral reduction to practice that is the result
of the inventor's mental experimentation.
B. Conception of Embodiment Alone Is Sufficient for
Application of the "On Sale" Bar
The Federal Circuit's journey towards conception alone being
the determining factor in applying the "on sale" bar had its origins
in Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Machinery,
Ltd.,254 in which the court noted that "[iut is not difficult to con-
ceive of a situation where, because commercial benefits outside the
allowed time have been great, the technical requisite . . . for a
251. For a thorough discussion of conception, see 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 10.04
(1992).
252. 11 App. D.C. 264 (1897).
253. Id. at 276.
254. 731 F.2d 831 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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physical embodiment, particularly for a simple product, would de-
feat the statutory policy"2 55 of preventing an inventor from com-
mercially exploiting his invention beyond the statutorily pre-
scribed seventeen-year period. Notwithstanding its restrictive
language (i.e., "simple product"), the court nevertheless implicitly
indicated that conception may be enough to start the "on sale"
clock ticking, regardless of the complexity of the invention.256
In UMC Electronics Co. v. United States,5 the Federal Circuit
took the ball from Barmag and ran with it. The court in UMC,
however, fell just short of a touchdown. Judge Nies stated:
In view of all of the above considerations, we conclude that
reduction to practice of the claimed invention has not been and
should not be made an absolute requirement of the on-sale bar.
We hasten to add, however, that we do not intend to sanction
attacks on patents on the ground that the inventor or another
offered for sale, before the critical date, the mere concept of the
invention .... On the other hand, we reject UMC's position
that as a matter of law no on-sale bar is possible unless the
claimed invention has been reduced to practice in the interfer-
ence sense.
... Thus, we simply say here that the on-sale bar does not
necessarily turn on whether there was or was not a reduction to
practice of the claimed invention. 58
Although UMC appeared to eliminate reduction to practice as a
requirement, the court stopped short of holding that conception
alone is sufficient to activate the "on sale" bar. As a result, Federal
Circuit case law relating to the "on sale" bar is shrouded in ambi-
guity. Somewhere between conception and reduction to practice
lies an undefined standard.
We would agree with the court in UMC if by "mere concept" it
meant conception of result. One can surmise that the Federal Cir-
cuit's hesitation may have been due to its recognition of certain
situations in which conception (conception of result), if permitted
255. Id. at 837 (emphasis added).
256. See id.
257. 816 F.2d 647 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
258. Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
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to trigger the "on sale" bar, may actually be detrimental to those
whom the "on sale" bar was designed to protect.
For example, inventor A conceives of a cure for cancer, but has
not conducted any experimentation and has virtually no knowledge
of oncology. In essence, inventor A has only a desired end result in
mind: a cure for cancer. Inventor A subsequently offers this con-
cept (conception of result) for sale, and not surprisingly, has diffi-
culty finding a market for his concept. More than one year after
inventor A's offer for sale, inventor B conceives (conception of re-
sult) of a cure for cancer, independent of inventor A. Unlike inven-
tor A, however, inventor B conceives of a detailed and operative
means (conception of embodiment) for achieving her concept (con-
ception of result). Inventor B files for a patent application.
If conception of result alone were sufficient to trigger the "on
sale" bar, inventor B would be precluded from obtaining patent
protection for her cure for cancer. Such a result would be unfair in
that inventor A had only a "mere concept," whereas inventor B,
though still in the conception stage, conceived not only of the end
result, but also the means of achieving that result.
By dichotomizing conception into conception of embodiment
and conception of result, however, an equitable balance is reached
between the interests of society, on the one hand, and the interests
of inventors who have achieved conception of embodiment to ac-
company their conception of result, on the other.
In light of the underlying policies of the "on sale" bar,2 59 pre-
cluding application of the "on sale" bar if the inventor has offered
for sale a conceptual embodiment of her invention makes little
sense. In making conception of embodiment the only state at
which the invention can exist before the "on sale" bar applies, we
remain faithful to the underlying policies of the "on sale" bar.
Therefore, although the Federal Circuit in UMC was correct in
eliminating actual reduction to practice as a requirement for appli-
cation of the "on sale" bar, it should have taken one more step and
259. The policies underlying the "on sale" bar "define the terms of the statute." Barmag,
731 F.2d at 836. Specifically, the policy against permitting the inventor to exploit commer-
cially the exclusivity of his invention beyond the statutory 17 years, and the policy favoring
prompt disclosure of inventions to society, are significant in this regard. Id.
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pointed out that an offer of a conception of embodiment may be
sufficient to apply the "on sale" bar.
Let us elaborate on- our initial hypothetical. An inventor, in re-
sponse to a request for a bid proposal from a corporation, discloses
her invention to the corporation in hopes of obtaining the corpo-
rate contract. The invention is at the conception of embodiment
stage, that is, the inventor has in mind a complete and operative
invention as it will thereafter be applied in practice. This determi-
nation is made by analyzing the content of the inventor's disclo-
sure, such as verbal representations, laboratory notes, and draw-
ings. Sixteen months after the disclosure, the inventor files a
patent application claiming the same invention that was the sub-
ject of the disclosure.
In view of the underlying policies of section 102(b), the inventor
should be precluded from obtaining patent protection for her in-
vention. The inventor, in bidding for the corporate contract, has
engaged in premature commercial exploitation, which also serves
to preclude society from reaping the benefits of her invention in a
timely fashion. Why is it necessary for the inventor here to have
offered more than a conceptual embodiment of her invention
before the "on sale" bar applies? It is the intent of the inventor
with which we are concerned: "The policies underlying the on-sale
bar .. .concentrate on the attempt by the inventor to exploit
[her] invention, not whether the potential purchaser was cognizant
of the invention. '26 0
In making the bid, the inventor either believed that her inven-
tion was attainable in its disclosed form or an obvious variation
thereof, or was simply less than forthcoming with the truth. Fur-
ther, the inventor should not be able to seek refuge under section
102(b) by claiming that her invention was only in the conception
stage. The bid never should have been proposed to the corporation
unless the inventor was certain that, within one year from the pro-
posal, a patent application would be on file. If she were certain of
such a result, but did not file within one year from her bid propo-
sal, the inventor had no one to blame but herself.
260. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 860 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
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A degree of equitableness is established by engaging in a bifur-
cated conceptual analysis. The Federal Circuit should define a
"mere concept" as conception of result and proceed to elaborate
further on this notion of conception. In so doing, the Federal Cir-
cuit should recognize that there are situations in which conception
standing alone (i.e., conception of embodiment) is sufficient to trig-
ger the "on sale" bar.
C. Experimental Use and Conception of Embodiment
Experimental use has occasionally been claimed as a defense to
the assertion of an "on sale" bar.261 In essence, the inventor claims
that although his invention was purchased, its use was strictly to
determine its ability to produce the desired results.6 2 In RCA
Corp. v. Data General Corp.,263 the court held that experimental
use ends with an actual reduction to practice.2 4 How can one have
"conception" and yet still require experimental use to reduce an
invention to practice?
This question can be resolved by embracing the conception of
embodiment and conception of result dichotomy while also consid-
ering the process by which most inventions are created. First, an
inventor typically is confronted with a need. From this need, he
determines a set of desired results. His conception of results might
be defined as "a device to accomplish A, B, and C results which
weighs no more than X pounds, consumes no more than Y watts,
and costs no more than Z dollars." Next, the inventor might have
an initial conception of embodiment in which he visualizes a struc-
ture with certain subparts or circuits. He might build a model and
test it and determine whether it is inadequate. In addition, he may
conceive of a new embodiment or modifications to the first embod-
iment. Assuming this conception of embodiment is final, only the
actual reduction to practice is left to perform. The only allowable
experimental use would occur between the conception of result and
the conception of embodiment. This is only a minor modification
261. For a brief history of the experimental use exception, see RCA Corp. v. Data General
Corp., 887 F.2d 1056, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
262. Id.
263. 887 F.2d 1056.
264. Id. at 1061-62.
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of RCA's holding that there can be no experimental use after ac-
tual reduction to practice.85
V. CONCLUSION
The current state of the law regarding what stage an invention
must reach prior to application of the "on sale" bar lies somewhere
between actual reduction to practice and "mere concept." We ad-
vocate that "mere concept" should be defined by the Federal Cir-
cuit as conception of result, a level of conception that is insuffi-
cient to trigger the "on sale" bar. At the same time, the Federal
Circuit should adopt an "on sale" bar test that uses conception of
embodiment as its line of demarcation.
To allow an inventor or assignee to exploit her invention com-
mercially and thereafter seek refuge under the umbrella of concep-
tion, thus evading the "on sale" bar, is to allow the inventor to
undercut the underlying policies of the "on sale" bar, as well as to
sanction a disservice to society.
265. This modification is required if the definition of conception is to be respected. How-
ever, it leaves the inventor with a dilemma if he does give or sell the device to someone for
testing. If the device works, the inventor has put the device on sale. If it does not work, then
he has not yet had a conception of embodiment. Thus, experimental use is allowed only as a
preconception aid, not a postconception check. Again, actual reduction to practice is
irrelevant.
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APPENDIX
DECISIONS, JUDGES, AND HOLDINGS
Although statistics can be misleading, a review of the Federal
Circuit decisions, based upon the composition of the three-judge
panels involved, may be useful to the reader.
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Envirotech Corp. 6/5/90 Mayer, J.*
v Westech Engineering, Archer, J.
Inc., 904 F.2d 1571 Plager, J.
(Fed. Cir. 1990)
Manville Sales 10/23/90 Michel, J.*
Corp. v Paramount Archer, J.
Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d Clevenger, J.
544 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
Sonoscan, Inc. v 6/12/91 Lourie, J.*
Sonotek, Inc., 936 F.2d Clevenger, J.
1261 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Rader, J.
* wrote opinion of the court
** retired or deceased






Clearly, the Federal Circuit rarely will overturn a district court's
holding of "on sale." Only in Enurotech and Manville were there
sufficient facts to allow the Federal Circuit to deem the inventions
not "on sale."
